ALL ROADS LEAD BACK TO FLOODING

The Philippines is known as the world’s highest exposure to tropical cyclones, with around 19 typhoons entering the Philippine Area of Responsibility each year. With storms this frequent, flood-control should be a necessity—not a question. Yet why does the water keep coming back despite millions poured into flood-control projects?

In Pangasinan's Third Congressional District, six localities—Bayambang, Calasiao, Malasiqui, Mapandan, San Carlos City, and Santa Barbara—are identified in a 2025 Bombo Radyo Dagupan report as areas covered by the district engineering office. According to Construction Section Chief Engr. John Liwanag, the office had 102 flood-control projects from 2022 to 2025, including 37 projects in 2025 alone. The report said most were located near rivers.

But when the rains came, were these projects enough to protect the communities they were built for?

ARE THERE GHOSTS IN THE RECORD?

The reported 37 projects in 2025 were part of a four-year total of 102 flood-control projects. The annual figures cited by Bombo Radyo were four projects in 2022, 47 in 2023, 14 in 2024, and 37 in 2025. Engr. Liwanag said the projects were intended to reduce flooding across the six areas. He also said individual projects were limited to ₱50 million.

A project count, however, says little about the protection actually delivered. Each structure has a specific location, cost, scope, contractor, completion date, and intended function. Matching these records against documented flooding, damage reports, and community experiences allows the projects to be examined beyond the word “completed.”

One documented example is the flood-control structure along the Marusay River in Barangay Talospatang, Malasiqui. According to the Philippine News Agency (PNA), the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) completed the project in 2025 to help protect vulnerable communities and farmlands from flooding and soil erosion. The project was reported at ₱9.5 million.

A separate report sourced from the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) placed the project's cost at ₱9.54 million and said it was funded through the 2025 General Appropriations Act. It covered 77.60 linear meters of slope-protection works, including steel sheet piles, structural concrete, a revetment wall, and a parapet wall.

The procurement record, meanwhile, listed an Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) worth ₱9.9 million for the same project, with a required completion period of 96 calendar days.

The differing figures are not necessarily contradictory. They refer to different stages or descriptions of the same procurement: the amount reported in news coverage, the agency-reported project cost, and the ABC stated in the bidding documents. They should therefore not simply be added together.

What matters is what those records establish. Public funds were allocated for a structure intended to address a known flooding risk along the Marusay River.

PIA described the river as historically prone to overflowing during the rainy season, with flooding linked to soil erosion, damaged farmland, and risks to infrastructure. DPWH Ilocos Region Information Officer Esperanza Tinaza said the structure was designed to protect the community during typhoons and monsoon rains.

Then came the rains.

H2O OR H₂NO?

On July 23, 2025, Calasiao was under a state of calamity as flooding continued after days of heavy rain. GMA Regional TV reported that the Calasiao Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office (DRRMO) recorded 21 submerged barangays by 11 a.m., with floodwaters reaching as high as six feet in some areas. The Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office reported 10,236 affected families.

The scale of the flooding was also reflected in reports from other outlets. The Inquirer reported that 17 of Calasiao's 24 barangays were heavily flooded, with around 18,000 residents displaced.

For residents, the numbers translated into homes that could no longer provide a safe place to stay.

“Hanggang six feet above, lagpas taong tubig baha,” Kristine Joy Chan Soriano, spokesperson of the Calasiao DRRMO, said.

Evacuee Gemma Bularda described the situation inside her home as floodwaters rose.

“Wala kami hihigaan kasi kama lang. Lumutang-lutang na talaga kaming dalawa humihiga,” she told GMA Regional TV.

The flooding did not end in July.

On September 24, 2025, GMA Regional TV reported flooding in 16 Calasiao barangays following continuous rains associated with Super Typhoon Nando. As of 2 p.m., 4,055 families or 13,270 individuals had been affected, while the Marusay River remained at critical level.

BUILT ≠ PROTECTED

The repeated flooding does not, by itself, prove that the flood-control projects failed. Flooding can be influenced by rainfall intensity, river levels, upstream flows, drainage capacity, land use, and the condition of other flood-management infrastructure.

But that distinction does not end the inquiry. It makes the project records more important.

A flood-control structure is designed to address a particular risk in a particular location. Its effectiveness therefore cannot be measured solely by whether the project was completed or how much money was spent. It must also be considered alongside the conditions it was built to address and what happened to the structure after construction.

Calasiao Mayor Patrick Caramat later pushed for a broader approach to flood management. In October 2025, he called for a Flood Resilience, Mitigation, and Management Council involving government, private-sector, business, and technical representatives.

Caramat said, “Our town has no drainage master plan,” pointing to drainage as part of the town's flooding problem.

That concern is significant because a flood-control structure cannot function in isolation. A riverbank project may protect a particular stretch of land, but flooding across a municipality can also depend on how water enters, moves through, and drains from the wider area.

The flood-control network also faced documented damage.

Bombo Radyo reported in August 2025 that a slope-protection project in Barangay Tuliao, Santa Barbara had sustained damage while it was still unfinished. Engr. Liwanag said the contractor remained responsible for completing the work and that completed projects remained covered by a warranty period for repairs. The report also said DPWH maintained that it was monitoring its flood-control projects and denied the existence of ghost projects in the district. 

That distinction matters.

A damaged or ineffective structure is not automatically proof of corruption. Correspondingly, a project being marked completed does not automatically prove that it has solved the flooding problem.

The question is whether the records, project conditions, and experiences on the ground align with what each project was intended to deliver.

COUNT THE PROJECTS. TEST THE PROMISE.

The available figures show a substantial volume of flood-control work: 102 projects over four years, including 37 reported in 2025. They also show the scale of the problem these projects were intended to address—21 flooded barangays and 10,236 affected families in Calasiao in July, followed by 16 flooded barangays and 13,270 affected individuals in September. What those numbers do not yet establish is whether every project delivered the protection for which it was designed.

That requires looking beyond the number of projects and into their individual records: where they were built, how much was appropriated, who received the contracts, when construction began, when it was completed, whether it was inspected, and what happened to the structure afterward.

For communities living beside rivers, the value of a flood-control project is ultimately not measured by the number printed on a procurement document. It is measured when the rain comes.

Public funds can build structures. Concrete can reinforce riverbanks. Government records can mark projects as completed. But communities deserve to know whether those investments actually provide the protection they were intended to deliver.

If all roads are built to lead communities away from the flood, they should not keep finding themselves back in it.

Until then, all roads lead back to flooding.